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From Mellmott to Madoff:
History in the (Re) Making
“History” has never enjoyed a peaceful existence. There has
been a constant struggle over the primacy of ideas. The tacit
agenda of mainstream history is often to elevate the version of
the victors and to defend the status quo. A few years ago, doctoral students attending an American Accounting Association
(AAA) colloquium were informed by an eminent, tenured professor that nothing in The Accounting Review (TAR) older than five
years was worth reading.1
Editors of TAR and the Journal of Accounting Research
(JAR) did not always express such distain for past scholarship.
JAR was a joint creation of the University of Chicago and the
London School of Economics (LSE). The latter was dominated
by historians such as Will Baxter and Harold Edey. Their graduate disciples came to dominate chair appointments in the U.K.
and beyond. Most notable were Peter Bird, Sir Brian Carsberg,
David Solomons, Robert Parker, Geoffrey Harcourt, and Tony
Lowe.
While archivalism/empiricism typified the research focus
of the LSE’s “Godfather-Originals” (Edey and Baxter), their
first-generation students diversified into quite eclectic directions (managerial economics [Sir Brian Carsberg]; managerial
economics, philosophy, general systems theory, and cybernetics [Tony Lowe]; and, inter alia, income theory and economics
[Robert Parker]).
The transition from history to market studies proceeded at
different speeds in JAR and TAR. TAR, a “public society” journal, was slower to embrace market studies and abandon history.
We challenge any reader to recall the titles and authors of the first article of
the first 2005 issue of TAR.
1
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However, 1965 marked a turning point in bringing TAR to heel.
Pressure from the then Big Eight accounting firms and their
clients forced the editor of TAR to tell Abraham Briloff “never to
submit his work to TAR again” [Tinker and Puxty, 1995]. Briloff
was the bête noire of the Big Eight and their clients.2
The capitulation of TAR to market forces was accomplished
directly and indirectly. Directly, the AAA became increasingly dependent on non-membership fees as a source of revenue [Tinker,
2001]. Indirectly, the Big Eight and their clients colonized the
professoriate with funding of chairs and research. This gave a
“chosen few” an elevated status and access to research finance
and, therefore, publications. This “edge” allowed market-friendly professors access to positions of influence via publications,
editorial-board memberships, and executive-committee appointments at the AAA [Williams, 1980, 1985].
The rush to “market” was a lot easier for a private journal
like JAR under the tutelage of its editor, Nicholas Dopuch.
Dopuch was based at the (private) University of Chicago that
openly courts market sources of funding from the Big Eight,
their clients, and anyone else willing to pay. Private sources are
the lifeblood of private universities.
Dopuch had no qualms about dumping JAR’s connection
with the LSE’s quaint history and adopting a new research order
of pseudo-scientific rigor of regression-based market studies. As
shown later, this self-declared brand of positivism and empiricism in accounting is philosophically naïve [Tinker et al., 1982;
Christenson, 1983].
Importantly, for historians who might lament the demise of
accounting history, as Marx pointed some 160 years earlier, the
struggle for ideas was no longer an intellectual contest about the
merits of ideas, but had been replaced by “prizefighters” [Marx,
1977, afterword]. For Marx, from around 1850 onward, the market was beginning to assimilate “political economy.”
Changes in the accounting realm were accompanied by
parallel movements elsewhere in the university. In the U.S, the
Cyert Report elevated the business school MBA as the premier
qualification for populating the upper echelons of America’s corporate management.3 In the U.K, there were no indigenous busi2
Briloff promptly switched to Barron’s to continue his critique of the Big
Eight and their corporate clients. With a much larger circulation than any academic journal, TAR’s rejection was a blessing in disguise.
3
The insertion of “business” into the U.S. university campus was not accepted without reservation. To this day, Harvard University only allows the Harvard
Business School to award a DBA, not a Ph.D.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol38/iss1/10

2

Sy and Tinker: From Mellmott to Madoff: History in the (re) making
Sy and Tinker, From Mellmott to Madoff

143

ness schools of consequence; economics departments typically
controlled any business and accounting curricula. Accordingly,
the U.K. government provided seed-money of £30 million to
establish the Manchester and London Business Schools. These
were the bellwethers for others to follow. One consequence of
this growing commodification of U.K. education was the eclipse
of economic history, epitomized by the decline of history at the
LSE which has been replaced there as a training ground for the
sons and daughters of the rich and famous around the globe.4
History, philosophy, and “the classics” no longer appear on
the usual business doctoral curriculum. Aristotle, Plato, and
Socrates are dead and buried. These, and their fellow texts,
have been displaced by “modern math” that has erected its own
hermeneutically sealed, home-spun standards of “relevance,”
“truth,” “validity,” etc. Mainstream market studies routinely
report R-squares, often of minuscule explanatory size, as “confirmation” that their hypotheses have not been rejected and,
therefore by implication, remain “true.”
These tests are nicely isolated from the established standards of epistemic appraisal [Whitley, 1972, 1973, 1986]. Even
Karl Popper [1957], a conservative philosopher of note, demonstrates that any brand of empiricism/positivism that seeks
to “confirm” an hypothesis is not tenable from a philosophical
perspective. In his Logic of Scientific Discovery, Popper argues
that the empirical finding of one black swan (analogous for us
to a failed bank with a particular leverage ratio) does not allow
a researcher to conclude that all swans are black (or that all
banks with a particular leverage ratio are doomed). Inference to
a truth statement is a fallacious philosophy.5
Market-studies confirmationalists perpetrate tests that are
akin to trying to affirm/confirm that finding one purple swan
reinforces the dogma that all swans might be purple. This has
the convenient ideological purpose of affirming the status quo,
including the tacit thesis of market studies. The monotonous reuse of regression studies with familiar market variables tacitly
affirms that the market is equilibrating and therefore working
well in providing a proper allocation of society’s resources and
4
Seventy % of LSE students are now from wealthy overseas families. The
LSE is now the intellectual West Point (Sandhurst) of the U.K., training the next
generation of an indigenous elite that is friendly to the West.
5
For Popper, researchers should frame their hypothesis for refutation and
strive to refute the thesis with evidence. So, for instance, a hypothesis framed that
there are no purple swans that is refuted by the discovery of a purple swan allows
the researcher to conclude definitively that the hypothesis is refuted.
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functions best without regulatory interference.
Confirmationism serves mainstream accountants by protecting the reigning dogma (market studies). As long as the
contention that markets are “okay,” there is no need to consider
“inferior” literatures (history) that can be dismissed as “not de
rigueur.” Dissident research is censored because it might supplant the mainstream sovereign thesis and provide the tools for
unearthing “disturbing truths” that would trouble the status
quo.
The so-called top three journals, JAR, JAE, and TAR, all
play the same jingle, expressed in their own allegorical form and
delivering the same message with resounding consistency that
markets are “good” because they are efficient and are the best
adjudicators for promoting the social good (with the corollary
that state interference and regulation are “bad”). What is minimized and excluded by this sovereign position [Ryan, 1982] are
contrary viewpoints, those expressed in public interest, taxation,
interest, gender issues, history, management accounting, etc.
[Whitley, 1972, 1973, 1986; Tinker, 2001].
In the mid-19th century, Marx produced his opus Capital
[Vol. 1, 1977]. Adverse to the popular ideology, Capital is not a
eulogy to Communism, living socialism, or any other version of
“Mickey-Marxism” [Tinker, 1999]. These were self-serving appropriations by dictators and mass murderers who, according to
modern historians, never actually read Capital.
Fortunately, there is a change of heart regarding the literatures (including history) that are relevant to deciphering the
present. Desperate times call for desperate measures, and in the
intellectual realm, this means accepting the unacceptable. And if
the New York Times issues an edit, it is worthy of attention:
The financial meltdown has sent the literary-minded
scurrying back to the classics for insight and succor. The dastardly exploits of the Ponzi artist Bernie
Madoff call to mind The Last Tycoon (Fitzgerald and
Wilson, 1941) or The Way We Live Now (Anthony Trollope, 1941). At a time when hard-core free-marketeers
like Richard Posner (2009) are questioning the efficacy
of capitalism, the works of Karl Marx are being fished
out of the dustbin of history. Most classic critiques of
capitalism are much-mentioned but little read, the sort
of books people routinely cite without really knowing
what’s in them [Daniel Gross, 2009].
Anthony Trollope wrote The Way We Live Now in the 1850s.
His anti-hero, Augustus Melmotte, pre-dated Ponzi by 80 years
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol38/iss1/10
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and Madoff by over 150 years. If scholars and regulators had
read Trollope, Madoff might have been on their radar screens
and many other con-artists who preceded him.
Melmotte’s scam was far more outlandish than Madoff’s
operation; indeed, by comparison, Madoff’s operation appears
quite amateurish. Madoff preyed on Jewish philanthropic organizations, the Jewish communities in New York, and the snowbirds who flock to Palm Beach to escape the northeast winter.
Melmotte entered London society with a dubious pedigree.
He was a foreigner with a murky past who left Paris under the
shadow of a financial scandal. On his arrival in London, Melmotte underwent a complete makeover, burying all traces of his
past dossier and weaving his magic by playing on the greed of
the English landed gentry. Many of the latter were under financial distress because the primary source of their wealth, agriculture, was in the doldrums because of the influx of cheap corn
imports as a result of the Corn Laws.6
The landed gentry were desperate for new opportunities
to rectify their deteriorating financial condition. Melmotte appeared on the London scene like a knight in shining armor.
Like Madoff, he promised gullible investors spectacular returns.
Melmotte used the promise of undreamt riches from a railroad
venture connecting the U.S. to Mexico. Of course, unbeknownst
to the investors, not a line of rail track was ever laid. Instead, investor monies were used to create an aura of matchless success.
Melmotte took care to assuage any doubts about the integrity of his activities by displaying all the trappings of success,
providing comfort and reassurance to all those who had unwittingly bankrolled his venture. Madoff used his wealth to secure
gold-brick credentials. He built a new mansion in the center of
London, unparalleled in splendor and extravagance. He spared
no expense on the furnishing. He invited London’s upper-crust
to a banquet celebrating the opening of his new mansion, starring the Emperor of China. He financed a coming-out ball for
his daughter to launch her into English society and to introduce
her to eligible marital suitors. Finally, Melmotte used “other
peoples’ money” to bankroll a successful run for a seat in Parliament. Melmotte was “gold” and Londoners flocked to share in
his success.
6
The Corn Laws were a legislative coup for the emergent industrial classes
who were seeking cheaper costs, including labor costs that included the cost of
food used to reproduce their labor force. The wealth of the landed classes was
seriously impaired as a result of the Corn Laws.
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Like Madoff, Melmotte’s pack of cards collapsed with problems of liquidity. He was required to honor a promissory note
that he had issued in exchange for title to the mansion that he
had renovated and occupied. Melmotte had funds to cover the
obligation, but he had transferred his entire fortune out of the
reach of his creditors into a safe-harbor of his daughter. The latter had been abused by Melmotte for years and avenged herself
by denying her father access to the funds in his time of need. In
18th century parlance, Melmotte did not have “the readies” and
was not able to meet the call on the note. He was destroyed by
a liquidity crisis and shortly afterwards committed suicide with
poison, a more spectacular exit than the ignominious departure
by Madoff.
Like Trollope (Melmotte), Marx is also recommended reading by Daniel Gross. Gross [2009] cautions that texts like Capital
(and we might add, Keynes’s General Theory [1936]) are “…
much-mentioned but little read…routinely cited without really
knowing what’s in them.”
At this point, Trollope and Marx part company. Trollope was
the victim of “historical forgetfulness”; Marx, however, was the
victim of “historical revisionism.” Marx, in western literature,
was never even “much-mentioned” because during the Cold War,
Marx and Marxism were taboo. The mere mention of Marx was
to risk the wrath of McCarthyism.
In the U.S.S.R., Marx was “much mentioned and routinely
cited” by Stalin, Mao, Poll-Pot, and other mass murders. They
shared with western historians the bad habit of never actually
having read the original. Indeed, in the U.S.S.R., leading Marxist
economists and high-school students only read received texts,
usually simplistic renditions commissioned by Joe Stalin. It
was Stalin’s contention that since the U.S.S.R. had transcended
capitalism and had inaugurated “living socialism,” Marxism was
no longer relevant. Marx’s primary text, Capital, the analysis of
capitalism was no longer pertinent to the U.S.S.R.
Like Trollope, Marx’s Capital speaks eloquently about our
present predicament. Contrary to popular belief, Marx’s Capital,
Volume 1, is neither a diatribe against capitalism nor a celebration of Communism. As Ernest Mandel [1975] notes in his
introduction, “…the fundamental aim was to lay bare the laws
of motion which govern the origins, the rise, the development,
the decline and the disappearance of…the capitalism mode of
production….It is…an analysis of the Anatomy of Capitalism”
[Marx, 1977, p. 12].
How does Capital address today’s world-wide malaise? Marx
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol38/iss1/10
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begins with capitalism’s elemental or cellular form, the commodity. The “commodity” for Marx is not just the commonsense
notion of a thing that is bought and sold; its most important
variant is the labor commodity. Marx’s commodity possesses inherent contradictions and, therefore, inherent instabilities. This
is not just the vulgar or simplistic notion that labor is “exploited” (which, of course, is correct), but much more importantly,
the market quest for surplus value (profit) frequently stands in
opposition to the socially valuable aspect of a commodity (its
use value). This contradictory feature is the source of social
eruptions.
Instances of the opposition are legion; e.g., U.S. healthcare
for profit; banking for profit, and education for sale. Another
example is Enron’s cutting off electricity supplies in California,
nicely timed blackouts in the height of summer, to blackmail
California into accepting punishing price increases. Enron also
pulled the same stunt on 29 third-world (vulnerable and easily corruptible) countries. Enron hijacked the water, electricity,
and gas supplies of these countries, using contracts established,
sanctioned, and enforced with the blessing of the IMF, which
then aided and abetted the compelling of punitive price increases.7 The West Virginia mining disaster “pit” costs against
safety. Exxon Valdez and BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil spill exposed the tension between fuel needs and safety/nature/livelihoods. Finally, there is the case of the pollution of Paris’ publicwater supply that stampeded citizens into purchasing (privately
owned) bottled water.
While American and some European workers cower at
threats of redundancy and off-shoring their jobs, there is underreported labor unrest in China, Greece, Spain, and other regions
of the globe. The inherent instabilities of the labor commodity
are on the rise in different parts of the world.8 Like Trollope, the
lessons from Marx’s analysis are as pertinent today as they were
7
There were street riots protesting the increases in some countries. Enron
police assisted in putting down the riots and a number of protestors died.
8
The U.S. Administration was slow to grasp the significance of the financial
instabilities in the euro-zone to protect U.S. interests. Eighty % of IMF capital is
financed by the U.S., and the IMF was a major partner in imposing an austerity
package in the Greek rescue. Spain, Portugal, and Ireland are waiting in line.
Street rioters in Greece openly branded the U.S. for the austerity deal. American
banks came a close second as the institutional villains who had precipitated the
crisis. To add a further systematic risk complication to the mix, the Greek banks
owed nearly $100 billion to German and French banks (The German-led rescue
was not entirely altruistic.).
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in 1860.
Marx’s opus is a careful analysis of Capital(ism). Developing from our earlier work [Neimark and Tinker, 1987], we show
that Marx [1977, 1992] and his modern-day “students,” notably
Theodore Adorno, cited extensively in the original 1977 text,
has, like Anthony Trollope, a great deal to say about the present
crises [Ryan, 1982; Dews, 1986].
First and foremost, both Marx and Adorno argue that
capitalism’s crises cannot be resolved or cured; they can only be
postponed, deferred, or transformed. This is because the underlying contradictions of capitalism remain undisturbed, so that
the deep-rooted antinomies remain ever-present [Gamble and
Walton, 1976].
Before proceeding, it is important how much we can take
from Marx directly and how much we must draw on those who
use his mode of analysis. Marx wrote at a time when European
nations were still predominantly agrarian economies with a
growing migration of labor from country to town. The industrial
bourgeoisie was still an emergent class. There were no monopolies on today’s scale.
Notwithstanding the temporal limitations of Marx’s Capital,
Vol. 1, his legacy is a mode of analysis that endures and allows
contemporary Marxists to deploy in examining the present. For
instance, his identification of surplus value (profit and taxes)
as an expropriation from “productive” activity is expressed
today in the generation of massive quantities of surplus values
by corporations and the state. Modern-day analysis focuses on
where the surpluses (profits and taxes) are deployed [Sweezy
and Baron, 1966; Mandel, 1975]. For Mandel, for instance, the
military has become the primary recipient of the surplus-value
largesse, thereby creating a new “department” in the economy
and offering an analysis not too remote from Eisenhower’s 1961
warning about the Military-Industrial Complex. More recent
studies concentrate on the speculative destabilizing movements
engendered by the surpluses extracted by the banking sector,
used to pump-and-dump entire stock markets [Cooper, 2008;
Balakrishnan, 2009].
We begin by reviewing four contradictory dimensions of the
present crisis. Each positions the issues using the classics (Marx
and Marxists) and extends the discussion to the present crisis.
The four dimensions are the realization crisis, the concentration
of capital, the centralization of capital, and the misalignment
between identity and non-identity.
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THE FOUR DIMENSIONS
The Realization Crisis: “Pump-and-Dump,” “bubble-blowing,” and “bubble-bursting” are not phrases invented by the
“loony-left” but are deployed by contemporary economic commentators when pondering the state of the world-wide economic
crisis [Krugman, 2009; Posner, 2009]. Their meditations focus
on bubble-blowing by banks and, more recently, bubble-blowing
by nation states and their multiple stimulus packages [Tinker,
1992; Sy and Tinker, 2009]. What these analysts fail to ask is
why bubble-blowing was such a vital and necessary part of the
modern capitalist enterprise?9 The answer is to be found in the
forbidden texts.
Competitive capitalism strives for greater profit, either
through socially destructive speculation or by seeking ever
greater efficiency by producing “more-with-less” [Allen, 1975;
Shaw, 1975; Gamble and Walton, 1976; Braverman, 1998].
“More-with-less” means shedding labor. To avoid adding to the
masses of unemployed, capitalism must absorb the discarded
laborers, either by finding them gainful employment (economic
growth is the prime candidate as long as this can be sustained
by “bubble-blowing”) or by absorbing surplus labor by using
public-sector employment (the U.S. Postal Service, the military,
etc.) [Mandel, 1975; Gamble and Walton, 1976; Braverman,
1998].
The problem with the second solution is that it has a finite
limit. The U.S. Postal Service is seriously overstaffed, and further expenditures would inflame congressional fears of a new
inflationary crisis, instigated by government deficit spending
that would earn the wrath of the bond market.10 Nor is military
spending a sustainable option. Drone and other labor-saving
technologies reduce the required number of military person9
Alan Greenspan opined as such in his testimony before Congress where he
ridiculed members for their hypocritical change of heart. When the bubble was
swelling, he was their darling and had their undying support. When the bubble
burst, they turned on him like a pack of wolves. Senator Dodd of Connecticut,
where all the bank and insurance lobby money resides, performed a spectacular
somersault on these issues.
10
Inflation increases the rates that the bond market must pay on new issues.
Bonds issued prior to the inflation period will fall in value to give returns commensurate with the new market rates. Bondholders of those portfolios would suffer major losses. Accordingly, the bond market, four times larger than the market
of stocks and shares, hates inflation and lobbies heavily against deficit spending
[Cooper, 2008].
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nel for absorbing surplus labor. As public disquiet about the
death-toll of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan rises, there is growing
pressure to replace “men with machines” [Mandel, 1975; Braverman, 1998].
We are also hitting the wall for the first option on the list
– inflating demand with credit or bubble-blowing. Maynard
Keynes is dead! Anyone who has read The General Theory
[Keynes, 1936] would know that Keynes only advised using a
stimulus in the nadir of a depression (never preemptively) and
that a Keynesian stimulus only works in a semi-closed economy.
Today’s economies have extensive import-export relations, thereby mitigating the effects of a state-induced stimulus. This is the
reason for the tepid impact of the current stimulus packages
[Balakrishnan, 2009].
The first option, credit expansion by bubble-blowing by
corporations and banks, is also unavailable as these avenues
are closed-off. The real-estate bubble has burst, the housing
market is languishing, credit cards are over-extended. Dubai’s
real-estate now sports more cranes than building occupancies,
student loans are a slow-burning crisis, the Shanghai real-estate
bubble has been pricked by Chinese authorities. In the U.S. and
the U.K., mortgage delinquencies threaten to escalate as citizens
without jobs face come-due, first-time balloon payments.
One prognosis as to the future of capitalism may be found
in the writings of Adam Smith and his contemporaries that, in
the long term, capitalism will gravitate to a steady-state [Balakrishnan, 2009]. What this thesis fails to grasp is the dynamic
character of capitalism, its ability in the past to “invent” its way
out of crisis by destroying and then replenishing the capital
stock of entire countries like Germany and Japan with Marshal
Plan and today Iraq. However, today seems to be different with
stubbornly high levels of unemployment and the ominous possibility of social unrest in the U.S. already evident on a global
scale, led perhaps somewhat ironically by Greece, the cradle of
western civilization [Marx, 1977; Braverman, 1998].
The Concentration of Capital: The concentration of capital refers
to the growing size of banks and corporations.11 The savings and
11
Marx [1977, Vol. 1, p. 887] elaborates on these contradictions as they applied in the 1850’s (and as they relate now): “...The concentration of capital within a country and the dissolving effect of this concentration present nothing but
positive sides to him [Carey]. But the monopoly of concentrated English capital
has a dissolving effect on the smaller national capitals of other countries and is
disharmonious….these world-market disharmonies are merely the ultimate ad-
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loans crisis of the 1970’s was “deferred” by absorbing bad banks
into good and larger ones. The same tactic was redeployed for
engaging the current crisis. To avoid bank collapses and a systemic meltdown, presaged by Lehman Brothers, banks were permitted to engage in an unprecedented program of mergers and
acquisitions. Bear Sterns was absorbed by J.P. Morgan for $29
million; Bank of America “saved” Merrill Lynch for $130 million; Northern Rock, the Abbey, and Bradford and Bingley were
absorbed in the U.K.; Wakovia went to Wells Fargo; WAMU to
Bank of America; Morgan Stanley to Mitsubishi; and Fortis and
Dextor were swallowed in French, Dutch, and Belgian bailouts.
Consolidating banks does not “solve” problems; it merely
transformed them into new and larger contradictions, setting
the scene for future crises. These new mega-banks are now even
bigger, too big to save by their host countries, and their size
magnifies ever further the degree of systematic risk. A megabank collapse will have unprecedented reverberations through
the world financial system because bank interconnectedness is
now pervasive.
Figure 1 is a “too big-to-save” table. It assigns the world’s
largest 25 banks to their host country and expresses their combined leverage of that country’s GDP. Ireland and Greece do not
appear, not because their situation is not dire, but because their
banks and GDP are not large enough in absolute terms to qualify for consideration. This is a limitation of Figure 1, a drawback
with these data because, as we have seen in recent months, the
euro can be jeopardized by a minnow like Greece and via the
IMF, there is a contagion effect that threatens to embroil the
U.S.
The voracious, expansive proclivities of capitalism are
represented by the expansion of the commodity form (Marx,
1977, pp. 700-883). Congress because of lobbying is now commoditized such that banking regulation is subordinated to the
dictates of market forces, personified by “the lobbyist” [Stigler,
1971; Sy and Tinker, 2009]. Even the Volker rule (the firewall for
segregating high-risk investment banking from federally insured
deposits in commercial banks) has fallen afoul of the powerful
banking lobby [Stigler, 1971; Sy and Tinker, 2009]. Thus, if a

equate expression of the disharmonies which have become fixed as abstract relations with the economic categories or which have a local existence on the smallest
scale. No wonder, then, that he [Carey] forgets the positive content of these processes of dissolution...”
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FIGURE 1
Too-Big-To-Fail Index: Top 50 Banks’
Leverage as a % of Their Country’s GDP

COUNTRY

TOP 50 BANKS’ LEVERAGE
AS A PERCENTAGEOF THEIR
HOST COUNTRY’S GDP

Switzerland

595.32

Netherlands

336.86

Belgium

318.84

United Kingdom

206.21

France

198.07

Hong Kong

154.74

Spain

107.77

Japan

102.16

Sweden

82.96

Australia

82.07

Italy

70.32

China

63.26

Germany

49.88

United States

44.19

Canada

28.80

Source:
Eurobank

Source:
Euromoney

h t t p : / / w w w. e u r o m o n e y. c o m /
Article/1961042/Worlds-largestbanks-2007-Global-bank-rankings-Top-20-global-free-to-access.
html
h t t p : / / w w w. e u r o m o n e y. c o m /
Article/1533691/Worlds-largestbanks-Global-bank-rankings-Top50-by-shareholder-equity-free-toaccess.html
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future Goldman Sachs suffered catastrophic losses in, say, the
Hungarian, Russian, or Romanian stock markets, wiping billions of assets off its balance sheet, it would be U.S. taxpayers
who would be obliged to pick up the tab to protect U.S. federally
insured depositors.
The travails of the euro began with Greece, but grumblings
in Ireland, Spain, and Portugal have spooked international
financial markets, including the U.S. The IMF (with its U.S. paymaster) saved Greek banks which owed $50 billion and $80 billion to French and German banks respectively. So the U.S. is indirectly, but very significantly ensnared, in euro travails. And in
Germany, the bailout is costing Chancellor Angela Merkel’s party
dearly in the polls. The German voters do not like the Greeks!
Back in the U.S, the stock market dimly perceived that the
fate of the euro is not just a “foreign” problem. The geographical
growth of the commodity form in banking means that when the
euro sneezes, the U.S. will catch cold.
The Growing Centralization of Capital: Centralization of capital,
in popular parlance, refers to the manner in which control of
capital is in the hands of fewer and fewer persons. In this regard, centralization and concentration move in lock step.12 However, Marx’s definition of “concentration” is a variance from this
popular notion. For Marx [1977, Vol. 1, Chapter XXXIII], “…
Centralization of the means of production and socialization of
labor at last reach a point where they become incompatible with
their capitalist integument. Thus integument is burst asunder.
The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.”
For Marx, in his time, his notion of centralization focused
on the revolutionary potential of increasingly socialized, increasingly socially conscious, factory labor. In his era, the socially disruptive potential of factory labor was amplified through
trade-union organization and even political representation (e.g.,
the Labour Party and the Fabian Society in the U.K.).
Today’s trade unions in the U.K. and the U.S. are a shadowy
version of their earlier potency. It is easy to rush to the conclusion that Marx’s tocsin is no longer relevant today given the
12
This popular definition serves the convenient ideological purpose of personifying the source of crises in terms of “villains and bad people,” to paraphrase
President Bush. This ploy diverts attention away from the real source of crises,
not “bad people” (the market can simply replace them with more highly qualified
bad people) but contradictions in the underlying social system.
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emasculated condition of trade unions. However, this misapprehends Marx’s analysis that does not depend on the presence and
form of the trade-union movement. The basic social antinomy to
which Marx refers is not socially and institutionally specific but
is capable of assuming different institutional guises at different
points in history.
The basic dissonance persists today, but today assumes new
forms. The social self-consciousness that evolves from Marx’s
“centralization of the means of production and socialization of
labor” is reflected in the awareness displayed by rioters in Spain,
Portugal, and Greece (“IMF, go home”). The insurrectionists
at Toronto’s G8 meeting (“kill the bankers”) and the agitators
behind the growing number of strikes for better wages and benefits in China echo similar sentiments.
The Misalignment between Identity and Non-Identity: The “clash”
between identity and non-identity is perhaps the most pertinent
and theoretically challenging addition offered in this update.
Best elucidated by Adorno [1973] and Adorno and Horkhiemer
[1979], this “clash” describes the rupture between a social selfconsciousness (whether of an individual or a collective) and the
historical milieu in which that self-consciousness is embedded.13
The rupture or clash refers to the manner in which consciousness or self-awareness always lags behind its evolving historical
milieu.
Hegel [1967, p. 13, 1975, pp. xiii, 4, 70; see also Lukacs,
1971, p. 59] expresses this relation succinctly: “Only when dusk
starts to fall does the Owl of Minerva spread its wings and fly.”
In the same vein, Marx notes that “…the conventional philosopher always arrives after the feast has ended.” (“post-festum”).14
In contrast with this backward-looking recollection “at
dusk” (the “post-festum” analysis of the traditional intellectual),
Gramsci’s [1971, pp. 404-405] organic intellectual is an active
ingredient in social change (a dialectical dynamic of interven13
“An object can be conceived only by a subject but always remains something other than the subject whereas a subject by its very nature is from the outset
an object as well. Not even as an idea can we conceive a subject that is not an
object, but we can conceive an object that is not a subject. To be an object also is
part of the meaning of objectivity to be a subject” [Adorno, 1973, p. 183].
14
“Hegel’s…absolute spirit qua absolute spirit makes history only in appearance….For, as absolute spirit does not appear in the mind of the philosopher in
the shape of the creative world-spirit until after the event, it follows that it makes
history only in the consciousness, the opinions and the ideas of the philosophers,
only in the speculative imagination” [Marx, quoted in Lukacs, 1971, p. 16].
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tion and change; not a static, bifurcated Cartesian subject-object
split, but a philosophy where object and subject constantly reconstitute each other, albeit imperfectly):
…the philosophy of praxis is a reform and a development of Hegelianism; it is a philosophy that has been
liberated (or is attempting to liberate itself) from any
unilateral and fanatical ideological elements; it is consciousness full of contradictions, in which the philosopher himself, understood both individually and as an
entire social group, not only grasps the contradictions,
but posits himself as an element of the contradiction
and elevates this element to a principle of knowledge
and therefore action.15
The essence of the proposition that “reality” always exceeds
consciousness means that reality is always capable of delivering
nasty surprises. In the language of dialectics, the “negation-ofnegation” is never a complete apprehension of reality but always
something less, a synthesis with remainder. This remainder is
the unexplained residual (surprise) that provides the accelerant
for the next historical movement.
Today’s world-wide crisis provides a practical example of
dialectics in action. The crisis was precipitated in no small measure by a banking crisis. This “negation” has been “negated” by
a faint-hearted regulatory reform, an imperfect expression of
Adorno’s public consciousness. The negation-of-negation never
provides a definitive, final, or absolute closure, but always leaves
a remainder or a residual out of which future crises will emerge.
These insights from Marxist dialectics, as formulated by
Theodore Adorno and cited extensively in our 1987 text [Neimark and Tinker, 1987], articulates in a systematic matter what
is suspected in popular understandings of the banking crisis.
Banks successfully resisted the Basle lll efforts to impose higher
equity cushions. They defeated restrictions on leverage levels
and a collective levy to fund the cost of future bailouts. U.S.
banking legislation is also floundering in Congress, with the
Volker rule seemingly dead in the water already. The banking
lobby successfully resisted these regulations by arguing that, in
their present parlous state, any restrictions might fatally destabilize the entire banking system, precipitating a new and even

15
In such a fashion, Hegel/Gramsci’s Organic Owl appears on time for Marx’s
banquet and enjoins the guests with a “steak” in the future (becoming an historical player in making history).
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greater crisis.16
The result of these insipid, negation-of-negation reforms is
to set the scene for the next financial crisis. Since the previous
crisis, systemic risk has increased. Banking entities are now
really too big to save, and the firewalls between high-risk investment banking and commercial (high street) banking have been
dismantled. These were provisional “solutions” that sewed the
seeds for the next crisis.
Yet, banks may not be the epicenter of the next crisis. Nation states, including the euro-zone, are increasingly vulnerable
to defaults, not just for their sovereign government debt, but
also for default of their private banking sectors, as in the case
of the loan exposure of German banks to Greek banks. Already
bailout fatigue is setting-in in Germany, and new euro-zone
zombies (Spain, Portugal, Ireland) may be thrown to the wolves
by German voters.
The outcome for these “the three amigos” may not be pretty.
Their government and bank bonds will be downgraded to junk
status with increasing interest rates to prohibitive levels. This
will impose additional severe burden on their government deficits with likely violations of the debt covenants of IMF and euro
loans triggering further penalties. And so the dialectical roundabout begins again, this time with greater speed.
Citizens are not likely to sit quietly by and accept draconian cutbacks in jobs, social services, and benefits. People who
lose the ability to pay the rent, buy food for their children, and
maintain healthcare payments, etc. are unlikely to remain quiescent in a crisis not of their making. At the time of writing, the
renewal of unemployment benefits has stalled in the U.S. Congress, with Republicans demanding that the benefits be funded
from cuts elsewhere. Street protests in Canada against the G20
and those in Greece were not amicable. It would be foolish to
continue to deny that social instability is not a real possibility.
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